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A B S T R A C T 
Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs) opérate in autonomous or disconnected 
mode: sensed data is collected periodically by an itinerant sink. Between successive sink 
visits, sensor-collected data is subject to some unique vulnerabilities. In particular, while 
the network is unattended, a mobile adversary (capable of subverting up to a fraction of 
sensors at a time) can migrate between compromised sets of sensors and inject fraudulent 
data. 
In this paper, we provide two collaborative authentication techniques that allow 
an UWSN to maintain integrity and authenticity of sensor data - in the presence of a 
mobile adversary - until the next sink visit. Proposed schemes use simple, standard, and 
inexpensive symmetric cryptographic primitives, coupled with key evolution and few 
message exchanges. We study their security and effectiveness, both analytically and via 
simulations. We also assess their robustness and show how to achieve the desired trade-
off between performance and security. 
1. Introduction 
Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs) are an emerging type of sensor network characterized by mostly 
autonomous operations. Unlike more traditional WSN settings, which assume constant supervisión by a sink and real-time 
data collection, a UWSN is only periodically visited by a sink. Since UWSN nodes are forced to store sensed data locally 
until the next sink visit, UWSNs become susceptible to a wider range of attacks than common WSNs. In particular, between 
successive sink visits a mobile adversary (/xADV) can compromise sensors, manipúlate stored data, and abandon the network 
without leaving a trace. In the past few years, several research results [1-7] have investigated security threats unique to 
UWSNs, identified several types of adversarial behavior (varying in its goals) and suggested mitigating techniques. 
In this paper, we focus on the integrity of sensed data in UWSNs by considering the type of adversary that aims to replace 
authentic data obtained by sensors with its own chosen valúes. Within this framework, we make several contributions. First, 
we overview current solutions for the authentication problem in UWSNs and show that they only offer weak protection 
against a mobile adversary. Second, we construct two techniques - based on sensor cooperation - that provide much 
better security with just small increase in overhead. Both techniques are reasonably practical for energy-constrained sensor 
networks since they only rely on symmetric cryptography and involve few message exchanges. We also analyze proposed 
techniques in terms of robustness (i.e., dealing with issues such as message loss and sensor failures). Finally, we propose 
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several extensions that reduce energy consumption without weakening security. All results are backed by thorough analysis 
and extensive simulations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews related work while Section 3 introduces the network 
assumptions and the adversarial model. Section 4 shows that traditional authentication techniques fail to provide sufficient 
security in UWSNs. Two new cooperative schemes are introduced in Section 5, security analysis is provided in Section 6 
and simulation results and their discussion are presented in Section 7. Section 8 shows how parameters can be tuned to 
reach the desired level of security. Section 9 shows how to extend the proposed protocols to decrease overhead, while 
energy consumption analysis is provided in Section 10. Section 11 considers authentication of sensed data when the whole 
network has been compromised and Section 12 ends the paper with some concluding remarks. 
2. Related work 
Data authentication in WSNs has been the subject of many research papers, however they assume that the network 
is constantly attended by the sink. Several such schemes, such as [8,9], have been proposed for efficient sink-to-sensor 
broadcast authentication. In contrast, we focus on intermittent sensor-to-sink data authentication in the envisaged UWSN 
setting and in the presence of a mobile adversary. 
In other prior work, it is assumed that sensors can detect false/fake data via collaborative mechanisms for valué 
endorsement [10-14]. Assuming a suitable key pre-distribution scheme,1 sensors verify data collected by peers, in order 
to detect false measurements and avoid their transmission to the sink. 
An authentication framework for hierarchical sensor networks is presented in [15]. It leverages network heterogeneity 
to relégate expensive crypto-operations to the most powerful sensors. 
As mentioned in Section 1, some recent results considered UWSNs but focused on different problems and mobile 
adversary sub-types, such as data survival [3,1,2,4] and self-healing [5,6] for intrusion-tolerant secrecy. 
We note that data authentication for unattended sensors was first investigated in [16], where forward-secure aggregate 
authentication techniques were proposed that optimize storage requirements. However, such measures are only effective 
against a relatively weak adversary, referred to as reactive in [4]. Moreover, [16] does not assume a UWSN setting but, rather, 
a collection of non-communicating unattended sensors. 
A recent result showing some overlap with our problem has been presented in [17]: a mechanism based on aggregate 
signature schemes and Time-Release Encryption is used to achieve data authentication in UWSN. The proposal exploits 
both Symmetric and Elliptic Curve Cryptography to realize two complex and energy demanding schemes that are provably 
secure under appropriate computational assumptions. In contrast, our proposal is much simpler and relies only on traditional 
cryptography. 
Techniques proposed in this paper share some features with the cooperative key-healing approaches detailed in [5,6]. In 
both [5] and [6], sensors regain security after compromise using randomness provided by non-compromised peers. Secrets 
derived from combining peer contributions with prior state, are used either as keys (with symmetric encryption) or as 
randomizers (with public key encryption). However, symmetric key techniques are very fragüe since they assume no lost 
messages and no sensor failures. In contrast, solutions explored in this paper rely on purely symmetric techniques and offer 
robustness in spite of imperfect communication and potential sensor failures. Also, our techniques achieve higher security 
than [5,6], while incurring the same bandwidth overhead. 
Security threats in a WSN where data are collected by a mobile sink were studied in [ 18-20]. One result that also explores 
the unattended setting is the pDCS system [21] geared for Data-Centric Sensor Networks, where the goal is maintaining 
privacy of sensor-collected data. The concept oíparasitic adversarles introduced in Gossicrypt [22] is cióse to our notion of 
the mobile adversary, however, Gossicrypt relies on the sink's constant presence. 
3. System model 
This section describes our assumptions about the network and the adversary. Notation is summarized in Table 1. 
3.1. Network assumptions 
We assume a homogeneous UWSN composed of a set of sensors {si, s 2 , . . . , s„} uniformly distributed over a certain 
geographical área. Time is divided into collection rounds and each sensor is programmed to perform per-round sensing. 
The UWSN is always connected and any two sensors can communicate either directly or through peers, according to some 
underlying routing protocol (this assumption will be relaxed later in the paper). There is a system-wide parameter - v 
- denoting the máximum number of data collection rounds between successive sink visits. Each sensor s, has sufficient 
storage to accommodate 0(v) data Ítems. Each s, also shares a unique secret key and a unique seed with the sink: the former 
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is used to compute message authentication codes (MACs), while the latter initializes a Pseudo-Random Number Generator 
(PRNG). At each visit, the sink securely refreshes all keys and secret seed valúes for all sensors and resets the round counter. 
The envisaged adversary (/xADV) strives to substitute a valué (target data) obtained by s¡ (target sensor) at round f (target 
data collection round) with a selected valué — not relevant to the extent of this paper. Any sensor and any round are equally 
likely to be chosen as /xADV's targets. We assume that /xADV learns the identity of s¡ at the end of round f and, from that 
moment on, it has v — f rounds to accomplish its goal. /xADV succeeds if, at the end of round v, the sink visits the network 
and accepts the valué injected by /xADV as the genuine measurement by s¡ at round f. Sensors are neither aware of the 
identity of the target sensor ñor of the target data collection round. Thus, each data item must be equally protected. 
From /xADV's perspective, time is divided into equal and fixed compromise rounds. For ease of illustration, and without 
loss of generality, we assume that the compromise and collection rounds are of the same duration and are synchronized, that 
is both types of round start and end at the same time. /xADV can compromise up to a fixed number k (k < n) of sensors at 
any round. At the beginning of each round, /xADV selects the set of sensors to compromise (Cr) and migrates to them in one 
atomic movement. For each newly-compromised sensor, /xADV learns all keys, reads all storage/memory, and eavesdrops 
on all incoming and outgoing communication. Finally, we assume that /xADV does not interfere with sensor behaviors, in 
order to remain undetected. In particular, it does not delete or delay messages and does not introduce spurious messages. 
/xADV's only goal is to find and replace the target data. 
Since, /xADV begins compromising sensors right after the sink leaves the network, it could be that s¡ e Q, i.e., /xADV might 
have compromised the target sensor at target data collection round. This case is not interesting as /xADV wins by dumb luck. 
Wefocuson a more interesting and more likely scenariowhereSj g Q andpossiblys¡ G Cr, r < r. Inotherwords./xADVdoes 
not compromise s¡ while target data is being collected. However, it might have compromised (and then released) that sensor 
at some earlier round. 
4. Basic techniques 
Since /xADV is focused on replacing (modifying or forging) data, authentication is a natural defence. It can be attained via 
either symmetric MACs or public key signature. Although it is normal to expect the latter to offer better security, we show 
that - surprisingly - this is not true in UWSNs. To demónstrate this, we now outline two intuitive authentication techniques. 
With MACs, each sensor s, has a unique authentication key Kj shared with the sink. At round r, s, collects dr and computes 
f. = MAC(Kj, dj), where MAC(-) can be the standard HMAC [23] based on, say, SHA-2 [24]. During its next visit, the sink 
collects all tupies {r, dr, zr}i<r<„ and proceeds to verify their authenticity with Kj. 
With public key signatures, each sensor s, is initialized with a key-pair {SKj, PKj}. SKj is used to sign collected data, while 
PKj is used by anyone (e.g., the sink) for signature verification. At round r, s, collects dr and computes aj as the signature on 
dr: under SKj. Whenever the sink collects tupies {r, dr,, err}i<r<u. it verifies each a. with PKj. 
Unfortunately, neither approach is effective against /xADV: right after learning the identity of s¡, /xADV compromises it 
and learns K¡ (in case of MACs) or SK¡ (in case of public key signatures). Knowledge of either key allows /xADV to produce 
valid MACs or signatures on behalf of s¡, for any round. 
Protection against such a powerful /xADV can only be achieved if the underlying authentication scheme provides both 
forward and backward secrecy.2 The former is easy to achieve with simple per-round key evolution. Backward secrecy, 
on the other hand, is much harder to obtain. We note that key-insulated schemes [25-28] are unsuitable for our setting. 
The main reason is that, in such schemes, at least one of the inputs for the key evolution function must come from a 
sepárate (un-compromisable) entity, such as a remote trusted third party or a local tamper-resistant hardware device. In the 
envisaged UWSN setting, neither per-sensor secure hardware ñor a constantly present trusted third party is realistic. Thus, 
we are constrained to pursue authentication schemes that emulate key insulation, leveraging whatever meager resources 
are available in the considered UWSN scenario. 
Sometimes the combination of forward and backward secrecy is referred to as 'key insulation'. 
5. Cooperative mechanisms 
The main shortcoming of the aforementioned intuitive approaches is that the authentication tag of a given data item 
depends on the current key of a single sensor. Once that sensor is compromised, its key becomes exposed and data can 
be easily replaced. Involving several sensors in the authentication process for a single data item can lead to more secure 
schemes. In the following, we construct and evalúate two simple schemes that enhance UWSN security using so-called 
co-authenticators. We say that sq is a co-authenticator of s, if s, requires sq's cooperation to authenticate its data. Security 
is assessed as the probability that target data cannot be replaced along with a valid tag. Since public key signatures do not 
offer any particular advantage (Section 4) and are computationally expensive, we only consider schemes based on symmetric 
cryptography. 
5.1. CoMAC 
The main idea in this scheme (called CoMAC — Collaborative MAC) is that each sensor obtains help from a set of randomly 
chosen peers to authenticate its data, while storing the resulting authentication tags. 
At round r = 1, s, has an initial key K1 shared with the sink. At the end of each round r, s, evolves its current key Kj via 
a cryptographically suitable hash function F(-) to compute the next round's key. At each round, s¡ runs Algorithms 1 and 2. 
The former computes (and stores) a MAC computed over the sensed data. It also sends sensed data to t randomly chosen 
co-authenticators. Algorithm 2 receives data from peers, computes/stores MACs, and computes the next round key. 
Algorithm 1 CoMAC: MAIN 
Sense dT, 
Compute z] = MAC(K¡, d¡) 
Store {r,d],z¡} 
Set S] = SELECT_DIST¡NCT(t, n, j) 
for p = 1 . . . t do 
Send dr to ssr^ 
end for 
Algorithm 2 CoMAC: RECE1VE 
Set Kj = 0 
c = 1 
while round not over do 
Re ce i ve dr 
Set Kj[c] = p 
Compute MAC(K¡,dTp) 
Store {r,sp,MAC(K¡,drp)} 
Set c = c + 1 
end while 
Store {r, K}} 
Compute K¡+1 = F(K, r | |KJ[l]| |... \\R¡[\R¡\]) 
The function SFLFCT_D/S77NCT(t, n, j)returnsanarrayoftdistinctelements randomly chosenfrom the s e t { l , . . . , n}\fj}. 
Its output is based on the results of a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) initialized with a secret seed chosen by 
the sink. Let Sr denote this array for sensor s, at round r. 
During its next visit, the sink acquires collected data along with corresponding MACs. For each dT,, it verifies zr with K. and 
then repeats the process for each co-authenticator sq e Sr. If all t+1 MACs are successfully verified, the sink authenticates dr. 
Note that, since the sink knows all PRNG seeds, it can compute Sr for any s, and for any round r. Similarly, the sink can 
re-compute anyiCr+1 fromKr as well as the identities of all sensors that s, received amessage from, at round r (i.e., Rr,). 
In CoMAC each MAC authenticates a single data item. As we discuss below, security can be improved by bundling batches 
of MACs computed over different data Ítems from múltiple sensors. 
5.2. Extensive cooperation (ExCo) 
In ExCo each s, sends the MAC computed over its own data to t randomly chosen co-authenticator peers. Each sensor 
bundles its MAC and all MACs received from other sensors into a single authentication tag. At round r, s, runs Algorithms 3 
and 4. 
Algorithm 3 ExCo: MAIN 
Sense dT, 
Compute zj = MAC(Kj, dj) 
Set SJ = SELECT_DlSTlNCT(t, n,j) 
for c = 1 . . . t do 
Sendzr tossr[c] 
end for 
Algorithm 4 ExCo: RECE1VE 
Set RJ = 0 
Set ylj = 0 
c = 1 
while round is not over do 
Receive zj 
Set RJ[c] = p 
Setyi;[c]=^ 
Set c = c + 1 
end while 
ComputeHJ = MAC(zJ\\AJU]\\ • •-\\AJl\RJ\]) 
ComputeK¡+1 = F(K/||KJ[1]||... \\RJ[\RJ\]) 
Store {r, dj\Hr,Rr} 
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Fig. 1. ExCo. Colored sensors are the one involved in the authentication of data collected by s¡ at round r. 
The former algorithm computes the MAC of current data and sends it to t randomly chosen peers. The latter algorithm 
receives MACs from peers, aggregates them in a single authentication tag, and computes the next round key. 
Data verification in ExCo is similar to CoMAC. Once the sink acquires dr, it verifies all authentication tags involving that 
valué. In particular, to authenticate dj.the sinkmustverifyHJ and {Hrq}Sq£Sr. Verification of HJ requiresKr and {Kpr, drp}Sp£Rr. 
For any sq e SJ, verification of Hr requires {KT, dr) and [KL, dr}SpeTr where Tr = {[Js eSr Rr}. As an example, Fig. 1 shows 
a network where colored sensors are the ones involved in the authentication of a valué sensed by s, at round r. An arrow 
between s, and sq means that sq e SJ. In order to verify dr, the sink needs KJ as well as key and sensed data at round r from 
each sensor in SJ U RJ U TJ. 
6. Security analysis 
In this section we analyze /xADV's ability to replace target data and its authentication tag(s). We start observing that the 
latter is proportional to j ^ ¡ - , where Kr = {iC(,..., K¿} and XT is the subset of keys in Kr that are known to /xADV. 
We take a conservative view and assume that /xADV is proactive, roaming the network before learning r and hoping to 
discover as many keys as possible. Moreover, we assume that in order to maximize the total number of collected keys (by 
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Fig. 2. CoMAC. Survival probabihty of the target data. 
round f), /xADV compromises sensors in a round-robin fashion, choosing Cr such that Cr n {Ci U • • • U Cr_i} = 0. With this 
strategy, /xADV can 'visit' all sensors by round [~|] and, from that point on, it can replace any data subsequently collected 
by any sensor. 
6.2. CoMAC 
To win the 'game' against CoMAC, /xADV must replace authentication tags generated by s¡ and S[ at round f. For this to 
happen, s¡ must have been compromised by round r — 1 (that is, s¡ G {Ci U • • • U CV_i}) and sensors in S[ must have been 
compromised by round f (that is, Sf G {CI U • • • U Cf}).The probabihty of this event can be expressed as: 
*VDV (n,k, f , t ) 
k(r " 1) 
1 
n fcf • iffcr < n 
otherwise. 
The first term on the left accounts for the probabihty that s¡ is compromised before round r, while the other terms represent 
the probabihty that sensors in S¡ are compromised up to round r. Consequently, the security of the scheme is: 
:(n, k, f, r) = 1 - P^ADvín, k, f, r). (1) 
Fig. 2 plots PCOMAC in a 100-node UWSN, where /xADV can compromise k = 10 sensors per round. Even if target data 
collection occurs after /xADV compromises a substantial portion of the network, the probabihty of target data non-forgery 
is rather high, even for small valúes of t. 
6.2. ExCo 
With ExCo, /xADV must replace (that is, must be able to recompute) all the authentication tags generated using d\. In 
particular, /xADV must replace H¡ as well as HJ for each s, G S¡. 
For eachoftheabove authentication tags, /xADV must knowK[.Computationof/-í1r requiresalso (KT, dT) foreachsp G R\. 
Furthermore, for each s¡ G S[, computation of Hj requires knowledge of both (Kr, dr) and {(Kr, dr)}s eTr. To summarize, 
/xADV must have compromised s¡ at any round r <r and sensors in S¡ UR[U T[ at any round r < r, as shown in Fig. 1. 
To assess the effort needed for /xADV to succeed, we estímate the probabihty of any sensor being in at least one of the 
sets Rr¡, S[, T¡. Let ffi (respectively S, T) denote the event that a sensor is in R[ (respectively, S[, T¡) and let íR (respectively 
7, T) denote the event that a sensor isNOTin the seti^ (S[, T¡). We are interested in P [ r A ! « A 7 ] = P\T\~WAS] -P[1RAJ]. 
Note thatP[T|5? A S] = P[T\3i\, since belonging to set T¡ is completely independent from belonging to setS[. Indeed, 
sensors, G S[ because it has been chosen as a co-authenticatorbySj, but s, G T¡ because itself chose as a co-authenticator 
another sensor mS¡.P[T\íR] can be evaluated as follows: 
5 10 15 20 
Number of co-authenticators (t) 
Fig. 3. ExCo. Expected size of R U S U T. 
The last relation holds since sensor s, g TT only if s, sent all its t MACs to sensors not belonging to S[ (namely n — t 
sensors) and sensors, did not send any MAC tos¡ (since s, g R^.ASSJ cannot choose itself as a recipient for a MAC, we have 
that Sj g T[ because it has chosen t times from the same set with n — t — 2 sensors, always excluding s¡, s, and any sensor 
inSf. 
CombiningP[7'|<J?] with the fact thatP[5í] = P[A] = ¿ , w e can estímate v(n, t), the number of sensors involved in 
the computation of the authentication tags of generic data dr. 
v ( n , t ) = n ( l - P [ r A l A 7 ] ) > n 1 - ( l ~ ) ( l - ^ H > n M - ( l - - ^ ) + j . (3) 
Fig. 3 reports the expected size of the set Rr, U Sj U Tj, obtained via Eq. (3), fixing n to 100 and varying the number of 
co-authenticators t. For any t, ExCo achieves better security than CoMAC because each data is authenticated using secret 
material from a larger number of sensors (v(n, t) + 1 against t + 1) — without affecting communication overhead. 
These results are also supported by our simulations as shown in next section (see Fig. 5). 
7. Simulation and discussion 
In this section we present simulation results and discuss the robustness of the proposed schemes. 
7.1. Simulation results 
Simulations were run with the OMNET++Discrete Event Simulator System [29,30]. We setn = 100 and k = 10; for each 
scenario, /xADV is active for r rounds and corrupts k sensors at each round. Each sensor acquires one data item per round 
and authenticates it according to the selected protocol. After f rounds, we randomly select target data among all data Ítems 
collected during the current round and check if /xADV has all the required keys used to produce the authentication tags. 
Experiments were repeated 1000 times for each configuration of t and f; we report the resulting averages. 
Fig. 4 reports the size of the set Rr U Sj U Tr for t = 3, varying the size of the network from 100 to 1000: it reports the 
ratio between the number of times the set resulted in a certain size and the total number of triáis. The expected size was 
14.287 and 14.906 for n = 100 and n = 1000, respectively, while plugging the same parameters in Eq. (3) returns 14.42 
and 14.94, respectively. 
Figs. 5 and 6 compare the effectiveness of CoMAC and ExCo, respectively, showing the survival probability of target 
data, as described in Section 6. In Fig. 5 the x axis is the number of compromise rounds before f, while the y axis is the 
expected probability of non-forgery of the target data. Since we assume s¡ e Cr, if r = 1 /xADV has zero probability of 
success.3 However, if target data is sensed at round [|] or after, /xADV succeeds with certainty, since enough rounds have 
passed to allow it to compromise the whole network. CoMAC and ExCo aim at increasing security of target data collected at 
any round between 1 and ¡f(~\. 
Fig. 6 compares the two schemes with 3D plots of the expected probability of target data non-forgery: the x axis represents 
the number of co-authenticators (t) and the y axis is the number of compromise rounds before the target data collection 
round. ExCo results are consistently better than those of CoMAC, for the same configuration of t and f. For example, given 
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Fig. 6. Comparison between CoMAC and ExCo. 
t = 3, probability of target data non-forgery in ExCo is 0.8, even if /xADV has compromised 90% of the sensors. Given the 
same ratio of compromised sensors, CoMAC only reaches 0.3 probability. Even if /xADV compromises 90% of the network 
before target data is collected, ExCo with t > 4, yields the probability of target data non-forgery exceeding 0.92, while 
CoMAC requires t = 20 to reach the same probability. 
7.2. Robustness 
The analysis in the previous sections is valid for an ideal UWSN where communication is loss-less and sensors do not fail. 
In this section, we analyze the proposed protocols in a more realistic setting, where messages can be lost (i.e. not delivered) 
with probabihty X and sensors can fail with probability <fi. 
Message delivery failure: recall that messages are authenticated t + 1 times with CoMAC and, on the average, v(n, t) + 1 
times with ExCo. With unreliable message delivery, the number of sensors authenticating dr would drop by a factor of X in 
both schemes. 
Sensor failure: if a sensor fails, its resident data and all MACs computed over its own and other sensors' data are lost. Assume 
that sq fails at round r. With CoMAC, for each round r' < r, each dr such that sq e Sr loses one MAC. Also, all data sensed 
by sq is lost and their MACs can be discarded. With ExCo, one authentication tag for dr sensed by sp e {Sr U Rr UTJ¡ 
will not be verifiable. Comparing ExCo and CoMAC, the higher security achieved by ExCo is traded off against lower 
robustness. 
If messages are sometimes lost and sensors fail, the sink might find MACs that lack corresponding data, or data with 
fewer MACs than expected (t + 1 or v(n, t) + 1 for CoMAC and ExCo, respectively). In the former case, MACs need to be 
discarded. If sensors become aware that a peer failed,4 they can discard all MACs computed over data collected by the failed 
sensor. In the second case, data authentication is still viable, but in a weakened form. We consider the number of MACs 
collected by the sink as a natural degree of confidence regarding the authenticity of data: the more MACs, the greater the 
effort /xADV needs to make to forge authentication tag(s) of target data. 
8. Dynamic number of co-authenticators 
/xADV's probability of success is proportional to ^ . If /xADV moves in a round-robin fashion, the latter probability 
increases with the round counter. That is, sensors are required to spend more effort - cooperate with more co-authenticators 
- to protect data collected in later rounds, compared to the effort necessary to protect data collected right after the sink has 
left the network. 
To keep a fixed survival probability as rounds go by, it is possible to set the parameter t as a function of r. The sink would 
regard dr as genuine only if the expected number of collected tags computed on dr are all valid and the survival probability 
(as computed in Section 6) is not smaller than the system (tunable) parameter a. 
8.1. Dynamic CoMAC 
For Eq. (1), PCOMAC(A k, r,t)>a is equivalent to P^ADVÍA k, r, t) < 1 — a. To find the smallest t that satisfies the latter 
inequality, notice that: 
fc(f - 1) J-rkf-i k(f - 1) (kr - 1V 
/>Dv(n, k, r, t) = -± '- • Y\
 r < ^ '- • < 1 - a. 
n J_J n — i n \ n — 1 / 
Thus the smallest t that satisfies the above inequality is given by: 
ir, {V-<*)n\ 
I lOgkr-1 z 
t = i s-s=r \ fer - 1 / 
[undefined otherwise. 
i fkr<n
 ( 4 ) 
Note that if fer > n/xADV controls the whole network and sensor cooperation is just useless. 
Fig. 7(a) plots t against f anda. Ifa is greater than 0.8 and target data is collected when /xADVhas compromised alarge 
portion of the sensors, the network incurs a sensible communication overhead. The number of co-authenticators can be also 
tuned in order to guarantee that a minimal number of authentication tags per data will be collected by the sink, despite 
message loss and sensor failure. Let X and <fi be the probability that a message is lost (not delivered) and that a sensor fails, 
logfcr-1 ( V l f ) 
respectively. With CoMAC, s, at round r has to choose t such that t = — V , ^ if kr < n. 
This mechanism is out of the scope of this paper. However, note that this information could be inferred, for instance from the routing protocol [31]. 
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Fig. 7. Tuning t to have a fixed survival probability. 
8.2. Dynamic ExCo 
Recall that in ExCo, the number of sensors involved in the authentication of a data item is given by Eq. (3). At round 
. (1-oQn 
r, s, will choose t such that v(n, t) > riogk^i (V ' )1. First we use Eq. (4) to compute the number of co-authenticators 
n-1 Kr~í 
required to reach the desired survival probability; let this valué be x. Then we solve the following equation for t: 
n 1 
ln 1 
n - 1 
r 
t+2 
lOgfcf-1 
(1 — a)n 
fcf - 1 
1 
(t + 2) = ln (•-;) (t + 2) 
1 + T (5) 
If we take into account k and 4>, s, will chose t such that v(n, t) n - 1 v 7 
Fig. 7(b) plots t against r and a. The number of s/s co-authenticators at any round is almost constant, despite a and the 
sensors compromised thus far. 
9. TTL-based co-authentication 
Both CoMAC and ExCo require each sensor to communicate with t peers at each round. This means n • t new messages and, 
on average, n • t • */ñ one-hop transmissions per round. Since transmission is expensive, it would be desirable to lower the 
communication overhead while keeping the same level of security. In this section we introduce TTL-CoMAC, an extensión 
of CoMAC that uses a technique similar to the TTL of the IPv4 protocol, to decrease the communication overhead of the 
protocol described in Section 5.1. The approach we propose is inspired by gossiping [31,32]. We only present details for 
TTL-CoMAC; ExCo can be extended with TTL in a similar way. 
TTL-CoMAC differs from CoMAC in the way Sj picks its co-authenticators. In the latter, co-authenticators were randomly 
chosen among all sensors. However, several sensors between Sj and its co-authenticators would spend their energy to 
forward s/s request, without actively participating in the authentication of s/s data. The idea behind TTL-CoMAC is to have 
those forwarding sensors become s/s co-authenticators. 
Let d(Sj) be the one-hop neighborhood of Sj. In TTL-CoMAC, Sj prepares a co-authentication request {Sj, r, dr, TTL = t] 
and sends it to a random neighbor (Algorithm 5). 
Algorithm 5 TTL-CoMAC: MAIN 
Sense dr. 
Compute z] = MAC(K¡, d¡) 
Store (r,d],z¡) 
Set s , ^ $ d(Sj) 
Send {Sj, r, dr, t] tos, 
Algorithm 6 TTL-CoMAC: RECE1VE 
Set RT = 0 
SetX/ = 0 
Setc = 1 
while round not over do 
Receive {s¡, r, d\, TTL} from sp 
ifTTL > Othen 
if (s,, *, *) £ X/ then 
Compute M4C(iC/,d[) 
Store (r,s,, MAC(K¡,d¡)) 
SetKJ[c] = / 
Set c = c + 1 
if TTL > 1 then 
s, ^ $ d(s,) \ {{sP} U {s,}} 
X/=X/U{(s ( , s p , s , ) } 
Send {s¡, r, d[, TTL — 1} tos , 
endif 
else 
w = d(Sj) \ {x/ n {(Sl, *, *)} u {sp}} 
ifW = 0then 
sq ^ $ d(s,) \ {{sp} U {s,}} 
else 
s, ^ $ d(s}) \ w 
X/=X/U{(s ( , s p , s , ) } 
endif 
Send {s¡, r, d[, TTL} to sq 
endif 
endif 
end while 
Store RT 
Compute K,r+1 = F(K/||KJ[1]||... \\R¡[\R¡\]) 
When Sj receives from sp a co-authentication request (Algorithm 6) such as {s¡, r, d\, TTL}, the former checks if TTL > 1; 
in this case it authenticates d\, decreases the TTL field of the request and forwards it to a random sensor in d{s¡) \ {sp} U {s¡}. 
If TTL = 1, data is authenticated but the message is discarded. s, also keeps a log of received requests as a list of tupies 
{s¡, sp, sq}, where sp and sq are the sensor the request was received from and the one it was sent to, respectively. When s, 
receives an already processed request from sp, it only forwards the request to a random sensor the request was not previously 
forwarded to. If no such sensor exists, s, forwards the request to any neighbor but sp and s¡. 
In TTL-CoMAC, each sensor sends one co-authentication request per round, that is forwarded 0(t) times, for a total of 
0(n • t) transmissions per round. As all sensors along the route of the request take part in the authentication process, it is 
easy to see that the average probability that target data survives unforged is PTTL-COMACÍA k, f, 0 = PCOMAC(A k, f, t). In 
other words, TTL-CoMAC keeps the same security level of CoMAC but decreases communication overheard of a factor of *Jñ. 
The same reasoning can be extended to TTL-ExCo as well. 
TTL-based collaborative authentication protocols are effective against the adversary considered in this paper, but might 
perform worse than the protocols of Section 5 in the presence of a smarter adversary. In both TTL-Comac and TTL-ExCo, any 
two co-authenticators are one hop away and, as a consequence, all peers involved in the authentication of a particular data 
item are located in the network área around the originating sensors. A smart /xADV might focus its compromise activity 
in one particular área of the network and would succeed in forging data on behalf of sensors in /xADV's compromise área. 
However, we stress that /xADV's target sensor is not known in advance and /xADV has no knowledge of which might be the 
área to compromise to maximize its chance of forging target data. 
10. Battery usage estimation 
Sensors' dependence on limited battery power makes energy overhead an important aspect of any protocol for UWSNs. 
In this section, we evalúate the battery usage of the proposed schemes with respect to computation and communication 
overhead factors. 
Computation: Omitting normal CPU duty cycle costs, computational overhead mainly comes from the use of cryptography. 
Several researchers [33,34] have investigated the cost of cryptography in WSNs and all of them endorse the use of symmetric-
Table 2 
Computation and Communication costs. 
(a) Computation cost 
Protocol 
CoMAC 
ExCo 
TTL-CoMAC 
TTL-ExCo 
# HMAC (per node) 
0(t) 
0(1) 
0(t) 
0(1) 
(b) Communication cost 
Protocol 
CoMAC 
ExCo 
TTL-CoMAC 
TTL-ExCo 
Generated msg (per node) 
t 
t 
1 
1 
Routing cost (network) 
o(t • VW) 
o(t • VW) 
0(t) 
0(t) 
600 
500 
¡g 400 
o> 
es 
ifí 
I 300 
I 200 
100 
"0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Node 
Fig. 8. TTL-CoMAC. Number of messages sent by each node. 
key primitives based on block ciphers to obtain MACs. Without considering a specific cipher, we estímate the overhead of our 
protocols by measuring the number of MAC operations each sensor has to perform (see Table 2(a)). CoMAC and TTL-CoMAC 
require each sensor to compute, on average, 0(t) MACs per round; ExCo and TTL-ExCo only require 0(1) MACs per round. 
Communication: The energy spent on message exchanges in CoMAC and Ex-Co depends heavily on a given sensor's location 
in the UWSN and the underlying routing protocol. Both CoMAC and ExCo assume an underlying routing protocol that 
provides full connectivity. Moreover, note that WSN routing suffers from many undesirable issues due to the packet relaying 
performed by each node [31,35,32]. 
TTL-CoMAC and TTL-ExCo are less affected by parameters such as position and routing. The use of gossiping allows us 
to ignore routing/geographical constraints and to obtain a more balanced energy consumption throughout the network. 
To assess the gain obtained with gossiping, we report average results of simulations performed using OMNET++. We 
considered an UWSN composed of 100 sensors uniformly distributed over a square field of 40,000 m2 (200 m * 200 m). 
Sensor transmission radius was set to 30 m, which resulted in an average neighborhood of 8 peers (standard deviation 
3.28). Simulations were run 1000 times with each run having 100 rounds. Fig. 8 shows the distribution of messages; each 
sensor forwards, on average, 385 messages (standard deviation is 88.2), despite the unavoidable communication constraints 
suffered by nodes cióse to área boundaries. Since t = 4, the expected number of messages forwarded by every node at each 
round is 400 (Table 2(b)). 
Fig. 9 plots the deployment field and shows the number of messages forwarded by each node in the network as a mean 
to estímate energy consumption. It shows that battery usage is almost evenly spread among all nodes. In both CoMAC and 
ExCo, it is natural to expect higher overhead for sensors in the center of the network, due to routing choices. Local choices on 
where to forward messages made in TTL-CoMAC and TTL-ExCo result in a more efficient and balanced energy consumption. 
11. Self-healing for better security 
The security of the proposed authentication schemes decreases with the number of rounds the UWSN remains 
unattended (Fig. 5). Even if the number of co-authenticators is tuned as in Section 8, survival probability drops to zero for 
data collected from round [~|] on. This is because each sensor evolves its key in a standard pseudo-random fashion that only 
achieves forward secrecy. By round [~|], /xADV learns the key of each sensor and, by mimicking the key evolution process, 
it can compute keys for any such sensor for all future rounds. To remedy this, either the sink has to visit the UWSN before 
(or at) round [~|~|, or we need to provide backward secrecy for the authentication keys. Specifically, if v > [~|~|, we need a 
mechanism that allows a previously compromised sensor to compute a key unknown to /xADV. 
Some recent results [5,6] proposed sensor collaboration techniques to regain secrecy after sensor compromise. These 
techniques consider the same adversary and divide the UWSN into three disjoint sets: (1) sensors that are currently 
compromised (red), (2) sensors that have been previously compromised — their keys are known by /xADV (yellow), and (3) 
sensors with keys not known to /xADV (green). The last set is composed of sensors that either have never been compromised 
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Fig. 9. TTL-CoMAC. Distribution of messages throughout the network. 
or have regained key secrecy after compromise. To regain key secrecy, sensors exchange randomness and use received 
random contributions along with their current state to compute next-round keys. A red sensor cannot regain secrecy until 
/xADV releases it. Whereas, a yellow sensor that receives a random contribution from at least one green peer computes a 
next-round key that /xADV cannot learn. 
Using the same terminology in both CoMac and ExCo approaches, a sensor that is compromised and later released goes 
from green to red, and finally, to yellow where it remains, i.e., never becomes green again. If collaborative self-healing is 
used (as in [5,6]), yellow sensors can regain key secrecy and /xADV would be thus unable to forge authentication tags. 
Since we use generic MACs for authentication, the sink must be able to re-compute each sensor's per-round key in order 
to verify tags, i.e., the sink must "synchronize" each key it shares with each sensor. As noted in [6], if we use key evolution 
through sensor coUaboration, key synchronization by the sink becomes difficult or even impossible in the presence of sensor 
failures. 
To overeóme this problem in the context of data confidentiality, [6] resorts to publie key cryptography. Each sensor 
computes a session key through the collaborative key update mechanism and encrypts the latter with the sink publie 
key. Later, the sink decrypts the session key with its prívate key and uses the session key to decrypt ciphertexts of sensor 
measurements. 
Unfortunately, the use of publie key cryptography does not help data authentication. /xADV can still delete the target data 
along with its authentication tag and the ciphertext of the authentication key. It can then pick a random authentication key, 
compute a MAC on arbitrary data and encrypt the authentication key with the sink's publie key. The sink would consider 
fraudulent data to be genuine and the forgery would succeed. 
To the best of our knowledge, no other self-healing protocol is suitable for the UWSN scenario, and effective 
authentication of data collected after total compromise of the network remains an open research problem. 
12. Conclusión 
In this paper, we focused on a mobile adversary attempting to replace authentic data in UWSNs. We proposed several 
techniques based on sensor cooperation that achieve much higher security than prior results, with relatively low overhead. 
We explored the effectiveness of proposed techniques, both analytically and via simulations. We also demonstrated how 
they cope with real network issues, such as message loss and sensor failure. 
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